Another article examining the tense relationships between Malays (migrants to the land now know as Malaysia) and other ethnic groups, with religion as another fault line dividing the population
Malaysia: Overcoming ethnic fears
If ethnic controversies have become more pronounced in Malaysia, it is partly because ethnic consciousness has been increasing among all communities since the early seventies. Within the Malay community, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was partly responsible for this. So was Islamic resurgence which in a sense was linked to the NEP since rapid Malay urbanization in those decades reinforced the community's attachment to certain religious forms, symbols and practices that set it apart from the non-Muslim communities in the country. By and large, they tend to be exclusive and ethnic-centered in their outlook and approach, now strengthened by the global environment. The subjugation and oppression of Muslims in various parts of the world, often accompanied by their stigmatization and demonization, are much starker today than ever before, creating a situation where Muslims are convinced that they are under siege.
Among the non-Malays and non-Muslims, negative reactions to both the NEP and Islamic resurgence have resulted in an upsurge of commitment to their own ethnic identities and interests. There are quite a few non-Malays in various sectors of society who partly because of their own experiences with the NEP in particular bear deep communal grudges which are not conducive towards social harmony. It is resentment whose significance cannot be underestimated since a huge portion of the Chinese and Indian populace is already third or fourth generation Malaysian and therefore more conscious of the promise of equality embodied in the nation's Constitution.
These attitudes have been further aggravated by the situation in the school system. With the switch from English to Malay as the main medium of instruction in national schools in the early seventies, the vast majority of Chinese in the 7 to 12 age group now attend state run Chinese primary schools, thus depriving themselves of the opportunity to mix with Malay and Indian Malaysians at a critical stage of their lives.
As with the Malays, there are also global forces impacting upon the non-Malay mind. Islamic and Muslim demonization is often accepted as the truth by many non-Muslims and non-Malays in the country. They refuse to see demonization as a tool, employed by the powerful to not only denigrate their adversaries but also to camouflage their own hegemonic designs over the land and resources of the demonized.
It is important to emphasize that there are also some perennial forces at work which tend to keep the ethnic temperature high. The political manipulation of ethnic sentiments is one such force. It has been shown that in most multi-ethnic societies politicians on both sides of the government-opposition divide just cannot resist the temptation of exploiting ethnic issues in order to enhance their electoral standing, sometimes to conceal and camouflage widening income disparities and social iniquities within a particular community.
The fears
The fundamental fears of the Malays are linked, directly or indirectly, to their position in what was historically a Malay polity. They are afraid that in spite of all the constitutional provisions and public policies, they could one day lose control over their own land because of their perceived inability to compete with the economically more robust Chinese. If that happens, not only will the Malays cease to be politically preeminent but some of the principal Malay characteristics of the Malaysian nation would also be jeopardized. This fear has acquired an added dimension in recent times due to the rapid economic globalization and Malaysia's own position as an open economy in this increasingly borderless world. The pressures upon the Malay community to compete in both the domestic and international arenas have multiplied.
Sections of the non-Malay communities also have their own particular fears. They have for a long while complained about discrimination against them and they regard the NEP and the constitutional provisions that underlie the policy as inimical to the interests of the non-Malays. They are equally concerned about what they perceive as their lack of political clout. UMNO, they feel, dominates the ruling Barisan Nasional. Some non-Malays are also of the view that their languages, cultures and religions are not accorded the prominence they deserve.
A significant segment of the non-Malay populace has concluded from all this that Chinese, Indians and other non-indigenous Malaysians are 'second-class citizens'.
Assuaging the fears
To assuage these fears within the community which are largely unfounded, Malay leaders should show the community through honest and rational analysis that the Malays have made tremendous economic and social progress in the last 49 years. In almost every profession today, Malay participation is significant, compared to the situation 30 years ago. Likewise, in the upper echelons of commerce and industry there are a number of Malays whose hallmark is their competence and ability.
The primary reason for this success is the vast expansion of opportunities for the Malay masses through education and not through ethnic quotas and special privileges per se. To put it differently, it is the state's commitment to social justice, and not its ethnic agenda, that is mainly responsible for the upliftment of the Malay community.
Malay leaders should assure their community that neither Malay political preeminence nor institutions are under any threat from the non-Malay populace. The vast majority of non-Malays accept that a Malay core within a multi-ethnic national leadership is vital for national stability and harmony. What is important is for that core to be just and fair to all communities.
But it is not just Malay leaders who should dispel the unjustified apprehensions of the Malay community. Chinese and other non-Malay leaders can also give a helping hand. Chinese Chambers of Commerce at national and state levels and other trade and manufacturing bodies operating within the community can take proactive measures to assist Malays, other Bumiputras and even Indians to establish small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Since non-Chinese business people have always found it difficult to access the production, supply and distribution networks of SMEs, aid from Chinese businesses could provide a breakthrough. Malays and other non-Chinese should also be given opportunities to occupy the upper echelons of Chinese dominated corporations.
The overall situation of the non-Malay communities is better than it is made out to be by some of their ethnic champions. The Chinese remain as ubiquitous in the economy as they were before the NEP was launched in 1971. The Chinese rich continue to dominate the upper crust of the economy. Non-Malays are also actively involved in the civic and political life of the nation. Apart from playing leading roles in trade unions and NGOs, Chinese, Indian and other Malaysians are at the helm of a number of political parties both in the ruling coalition and in the opposition. Since independence non-Malays have become an integral and essential part of the nation's political process.
The solution
It would be too simplistic to suggest the rescinding of the NEP or the abolition of Chinese medium schools as the remedies. For even if the NEP is not there, the underlying fears and aspirations of the Malay-Bumiputra community related to its economic strength and resilience would still have to be addressed. Similarly, the Chinese school has become a metaphor for the community's sense of ethnic security and identity. This is why any effective, long-term solution should seek to overcome fundamental fears and apprehensions of all communities.
If the State is sincere about strengthening the Malay economy in the coming years, it is justice that should be its central concern. What this means is that it should harness all its energies to tackle what is undoubtedly the single most important challenge confronting the Malay economy: the challenge of widening economic disparities within the community. The state should also go all out to combat the pervasive rentier culture which has inhibited the growth of genuine entrepreneurship. Eradicating both corruption, which has emasculated the economy, and abuse of power should also be its national priorities. None of these goals would require ethnicizing the economy.
If it is important for non-Malays to develop some empathy with the idea of a Malaysian nation that had emerged from a Malay polity, it is imperative that Malay leaders convince the Chinese and Indian communities that they are committed to the evolution of a social order that will be less and less preoccupied with ethnic policies and more and more devoted to an all-embracing vision of justice that focuses upon our common humanity.
Only when justice supplants ethnicity will it be possible to overcome the current challenges facing Malaysia and ethnic fears be laid to rest.
By Chandra Muzaffar, President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST)
Asiaviews, August-September 2007
Showing posts with label Muslim. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Muslim. Show all posts
Friday, October 12, 2007
Asian Racism in Indonesia
Another article largely examining the problems that Indonesia is facing in regards to developing a working model of multi-ethnic and religious relations. Enjoy
The problem of multi-ethnicity in Indonesia
Indonesia is a multi-ethnic and multi-religion society but for most of its 62-year history as an independent nation-state, the Indonesian ruling elites have chosen not to deal with this reality. Their offensive and degrading interactions with colonialism in the past, together with their bad experience with various 'local' uprisings during the early years of independence, led to a 'a strong obsession with unity'. Now we can see how much this obsession has harmed the Indonesian people. Today we are paying the price.
Soekarno's decision in 1959 to adopt Guided Democracy as the governing principle of his reign and Soeharto's New Order policy to prohibit discussions on issues of SARA (Suku, Agama, Rasial and Antar Golongan-Ethnic groups, Religion, Race, and Intra groups) were all motivated by that obsession. So for more than five decades, Indonesians pretended to have a harmonious relationship with each other even when conflicts were occurring everyday. The Soeharto regime in particular has, for the three decades of his power, successfully 'put conflict under the carpet'. Except for recurring incidences of anti-Chinese sentiments in 1974, 1977, 1980 which reached its peak in the tragic May 1998 Riots, there was little information about conflicts around the country. Some ethnic Chinese Indonesians would argue that anti-Chinese sentiments were purposely nurtured in order to divert the people's attention away from other kinds of conflict, especially state-society conflict.
The situation went out of control after the 1996/1997 economic crisis which led to the fall of Soeharto's regime in 1998. During the first six-seven years after the new era of 'Reformasi' was proclaimed, social unrest happened in various places of the country, from Kalimantan and Maluku to Aceh, Poso and Papua. Nowadays, ethnic and religious issues have become the most important determinant in Indonesia's social and political life. It seems that after years of 'forced unity', the people have become too over- enthusiastic about re-learning the diversity among them and emphasizing the differences. In so doing, locality, ethnicity and religion have begun to create new problems of ethno-nationalism and separatism.
Our question now is 'shouldn't we re-learn unity and be united again?'
Considering the archipelagic nature of our country, where each island produces different goods that are being exchanged for the consumption by others, we actually should rediscover the meaning of unity. No island, especially the small ones like West Timor, would be able to support itself without the help from the peoples of the other islands, a reality that is reflected in the busy flow of people and goods in every day inter-island exchanges.
But how should we re-learn unity? The answer is 'from history'.
Clearly, mutual dependency, common interest, and a simbiosis mutualistic relationship have been developed over the ages and created a connectivity between the islands as well as between the people who occupy these islands. Our history has shown that the Nusantara archipelago, through its inter-island trading network, has become a social, economic and political entity which can only grow with cooperation between the inhabitants of its numerous islands.
As many historical records indicate, way back in the past Nusantara was widely known as a rich and prosperous place which attracted many foreigners to come and trade various local crops with the natives. Obviously it was the cooperation between the natives themselves which created a good impression of them in the eyes of foreigners and was an attractive pull factor.
If in the past unity gradually became a valuable necessity, today unity is similarly a must, if not more crucial, particularly under the pressures of current economic globalization. Without cooperation and unity, we certainly would not be able to compete with other countries.
In forging this unity, even the ethnic Chinese, Arab and Indian Indonesians should be included because each group has their own unique sociological role that cannot be replaced by other ethnic groups. Their contribution to the so-called Indonesian nation-state was written in the stories of their migration, settlement and existence in this country full of social and cultural exchanges, not to mention their friendly cooperation with the locals throughout the generations particularly before the Dutch colonial occupation. These groups, together with the locals, as a whole represent the diversity of Indonesia. As many have said, this diversity is a social asset that should be utilized to achieve the common goals specified in the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia, namely the people's freedom from oppression, their prosperity, security and dignity.
Finally, as a lesson learnt, the Indonesian case has proven that diversity and unity is not a zero-sum choice. Both are an undeniable part of the society with neither one more important than the other. The mistake made by Indonesians was to emphasize the importance of unity by neglecting diversity. The result was chaos still felt today.
To change the situation, the Indonesian leaders have to find the proper equilibrium between their desire for national unity (repeatedly articulated by military leaders as NKRI-short for Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia or Unitary State of Republic Indonesia-being "a fixed price") and adequate respect for the Indonesian people's diversity, their different beliefs, cultures and traditions. Only then can Indonesia achieve peace and stability.
By Thung Ju Lan, Senior Researcher, The Research Center for Society and Culture of The Indonesian Institute of Sciences
Asiaviews, August-September 2007
The problem of multi-ethnicity in Indonesia
Indonesia is a multi-ethnic and multi-religion society but for most of its 62-year history as an independent nation-state, the Indonesian ruling elites have chosen not to deal with this reality. Their offensive and degrading interactions with colonialism in the past, together with their bad experience with various 'local' uprisings during the early years of independence, led to a 'a strong obsession with unity'. Now we can see how much this obsession has harmed the Indonesian people. Today we are paying the price.
Soekarno's decision in 1959 to adopt Guided Democracy as the governing principle of his reign and Soeharto's New Order policy to prohibit discussions on issues of SARA (Suku, Agama, Rasial and Antar Golongan-Ethnic groups, Religion, Race, and Intra groups) were all motivated by that obsession. So for more than five decades, Indonesians pretended to have a harmonious relationship with each other even when conflicts were occurring everyday. The Soeharto regime in particular has, for the three decades of his power, successfully 'put conflict under the carpet'. Except for recurring incidences of anti-Chinese sentiments in 1974, 1977, 1980 which reached its peak in the tragic May 1998 Riots, there was little information about conflicts around the country. Some ethnic Chinese Indonesians would argue that anti-Chinese sentiments were purposely nurtured in order to divert the people's attention away from other kinds of conflict, especially state-society conflict.
The situation went out of control after the 1996/1997 economic crisis which led to the fall of Soeharto's regime in 1998. During the first six-seven years after the new era of 'Reformasi' was proclaimed, social unrest happened in various places of the country, from Kalimantan and Maluku to Aceh, Poso and Papua. Nowadays, ethnic and religious issues have become the most important determinant in Indonesia's social and political life. It seems that after years of 'forced unity', the people have become too over- enthusiastic about re-learning the diversity among them and emphasizing the differences. In so doing, locality, ethnicity and religion have begun to create new problems of ethno-nationalism and separatism.
Our question now is 'shouldn't we re-learn unity and be united again?'
Considering the archipelagic nature of our country, where each island produces different goods that are being exchanged for the consumption by others, we actually should rediscover the meaning of unity. No island, especially the small ones like West Timor, would be able to support itself without the help from the peoples of the other islands, a reality that is reflected in the busy flow of people and goods in every day inter-island exchanges.
But how should we re-learn unity? The answer is 'from history'.
Clearly, mutual dependency, common interest, and a simbiosis mutualistic relationship have been developed over the ages and created a connectivity between the islands as well as between the people who occupy these islands. Our history has shown that the Nusantara archipelago, through its inter-island trading network, has become a social, economic and political entity which can only grow with cooperation between the inhabitants of its numerous islands.
As many historical records indicate, way back in the past Nusantara was widely known as a rich and prosperous place which attracted many foreigners to come and trade various local crops with the natives. Obviously it was the cooperation between the natives themselves which created a good impression of them in the eyes of foreigners and was an attractive pull factor.
If in the past unity gradually became a valuable necessity, today unity is similarly a must, if not more crucial, particularly under the pressures of current economic globalization. Without cooperation and unity, we certainly would not be able to compete with other countries.
In forging this unity, even the ethnic Chinese, Arab and Indian Indonesians should be included because each group has their own unique sociological role that cannot be replaced by other ethnic groups. Their contribution to the so-called Indonesian nation-state was written in the stories of their migration, settlement and existence in this country full of social and cultural exchanges, not to mention their friendly cooperation with the locals throughout the generations particularly before the Dutch colonial occupation. These groups, together with the locals, as a whole represent the diversity of Indonesia. As many have said, this diversity is a social asset that should be utilized to achieve the common goals specified in the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia, namely the people's freedom from oppression, their prosperity, security and dignity.
Finally, as a lesson learnt, the Indonesian case has proven that diversity and unity is not a zero-sum choice. Both are an undeniable part of the society with neither one more important than the other. The mistake made by Indonesians was to emphasize the importance of unity by neglecting diversity. The result was chaos still felt today.
To change the situation, the Indonesian leaders have to find the proper equilibrium between their desire for national unity (repeatedly articulated by military leaders as NKRI-short for Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia or Unitary State of Republic Indonesia-being "a fixed price") and adequate respect for the Indonesian people's diversity, their different beliefs, cultures and traditions. Only then can Indonesia achieve peace and stability.
By Thung Ju Lan, Senior Researcher, The Research Center for Society and Culture of The Indonesian Institute of Sciences
Asiaviews, August-September 2007
Asian Racism in Thailand
Another article on Asian Racism - this time in Thailand. Enjoy.
Thailand deals with ethnicity
Thailand is not a multicultural country as its leaders often claim. The ongoing conflict and violence in southern Thailand reveal the country’s deep-seated discrimination and injustice against the country’s minorities who have different cultures, languages and religious beliefs. Thailand is a very diverse country with 79 different nationalities and linguistic groupings.
The hullabaloo surrounding the drafting of the new constitution during the past several months on the provision related to whether to declare Buddhism as the state religion is another case in point revealing the insensitivity towards Thailand’s diversity.
As in the rest of Southeast Asia, religious belief in this country is often linked to ethnicity. Approximately 10 per cent of the 66 million Thai population are Muslims and comprise the country’s largest religious minority. Almost all of the Muslim in the southern provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat are Sunni, with Shiites representing a small percentage. In the case of the Chinese ethnic group, they are either Christian or syncretic Taoist-Buddhists.
It is interesting to note how Thailand has succeeded in assimilating the Chinese. Within Southeast Asia, the Chinese communities tend to have strong cultural identities and societal links amongst themselves. That is not the case, however, for the Thai-Chinese communities. They are different.
Once they arrived in Thailand, they adopted Thai names, took up Buddhism and other aspects of Thai life and norms without any resistance. The estimated 13 million Chinese-Thai citizens are considered well off, both in terms of education and wealth, but they have chosen to follow the local culture and traditions. Any visit to Bangkok’s famous China town, Yaowaraj, would reveal this strong trait. While all the façades and huge neon signs along the main roads stress the Chinese-ness of their cultural heritage, the small alleys or soi and walkways show the other side of them being Thai.
It was only in the past ten years that the government has allowed the teaching of putonghua or mandarin Chinese. After more than half a century of suppression, the government is now enthusiastically promoting the teaching of the once so-called “communist language” which would require at least 5,000 language teachers from China.
In contrast, the Muslims down south live in isolation despite Bangkok’s claim of successful assimilation. They have more contacts with the neighbor in the south, Malaysia, than with their own government. This strong linkage with Malaysia continues unabated today, especially since the 1902 annexation by the central authority in Bangkok of Pattani and six surrounding areas. This places Thailand in a precarious situation.
Within their own communities, they have little interaction with the Thais. The only contact they have would be when the local authorities want to find fault with them. Their children attend religious schools or pondoks near their homes and are taught by religious leaders they know and trust.
Before the tumultuous event of 11 September 2001, the Thai authorities have never attempted to control or monitor the curriculum taught at these various pondoks, assuming that their curriculum must be automatically in line with the Thai national education system to take advantage of the higher education system for students in the provinces.
Since there is no standardized Muslim syllabus, the daily teaching method and its contents are being left to the religious teachers themselves. Many local pondok schools continue to teach Islam as the main subjects and Thai-Malayu as the main language, without sufficient tutoring in subjects such as the social sciences and humanities. Some parents do not want to compromise religious teaching classes with other subjects. As a consequence, children studying in private pondoks are unable to compete with other mainstream students coming from elsewhere, including Muslim children who study in Thai schools.
Thai-Muslims face two dilemmas once they reach their youth. Without proper education and lacking the Thai language ability, both oral and written, they find themselves unable to go for higher education in their own country. Most of them choose to go abroad or cross the border to study in Malaysia and other Muslim countries in the region or in the Middle East and Africa. But those educated abroad eventually end up unemployed upon returning home. A survey conducted by a team of scholars from Prince of Songkhla University showed that 60 per cent of Thai-Muslims youth in 2003 could not get jobs. Inevitably, they become a highly alienated group of youngsters. Full of frustration and a sense of hopelessness, some of them have been targeted for recruitment by either criminal groups or separatist groups.
Thailand needs to change its mind-set in dealing with its multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. Some senior Thai officials, for instance, including the statesman Gen Prem Tinsulanonda opposes the teaching and use of Thai-Melayu as a working language in the Muslim areas for fear it would diminish their ability to absorb the Thai language.
Besides the Thai-Muslims, other less well-know ethnic groups including the Karen, Mon, Chong, Mlabri and Meo are also struggling to overcome the injustice and prejudice against them. They want to be accepted and treated as equals in Thailand. The only difference is that their struggle continues without media’s attention.
By Kavi Chongkittavorn, Bangkok-based journalist
Asiaviews, August-September 2007
Thailand deals with ethnicity
Thailand is not a multicultural country as its leaders often claim. The ongoing conflict and violence in southern Thailand reveal the country’s deep-seated discrimination and injustice against the country’s minorities who have different cultures, languages and religious beliefs. Thailand is a very diverse country with 79 different nationalities and linguistic groupings.
The hullabaloo surrounding the drafting of the new constitution during the past several months on the provision related to whether to declare Buddhism as the state religion is another case in point revealing the insensitivity towards Thailand’s diversity.
As in the rest of Southeast Asia, religious belief in this country is often linked to ethnicity. Approximately 10 per cent of the 66 million Thai population are Muslims and comprise the country’s largest religious minority. Almost all of the Muslim in the southern provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat are Sunni, with Shiites representing a small percentage. In the case of the Chinese ethnic group, they are either Christian or syncretic Taoist-Buddhists.
It is interesting to note how Thailand has succeeded in assimilating the Chinese. Within Southeast Asia, the Chinese communities tend to have strong cultural identities and societal links amongst themselves. That is not the case, however, for the Thai-Chinese communities. They are different.
Once they arrived in Thailand, they adopted Thai names, took up Buddhism and other aspects of Thai life and norms without any resistance. The estimated 13 million Chinese-Thai citizens are considered well off, both in terms of education and wealth, but they have chosen to follow the local culture and traditions. Any visit to Bangkok’s famous China town, Yaowaraj, would reveal this strong trait. While all the façades and huge neon signs along the main roads stress the Chinese-ness of their cultural heritage, the small alleys or soi and walkways show the other side of them being Thai.
It was only in the past ten years that the government has allowed the teaching of putonghua or mandarin Chinese. After more than half a century of suppression, the government is now enthusiastically promoting the teaching of the once so-called “communist language” which would require at least 5,000 language teachers from China.
In contrast, the Muslims down south live in isolation despite Bangkok’s claim of successful assimilation. They have more contacts with the neighbor in the south, Malaysia, than with their own government. This strong linkage with Malaysia continues unabated today, especially since the 1902 annexation by the central authority in Bangkok of Pattani and six surrounding areas. This places Thailand in a precarious situation.
Within their own communities, they have little interaction with the Thais. The only contact they have would be when the local authorities want to find fault with them. Their children attend religious schools or pondoks near their homes and are taught by religious leaders they know and trust.
Before the tumultuous event of 11 September 2001, the Thai authorities have never attempted to control or monitor the curriculum taught at these various pondoks, assuming that their curriculum must be automatically in line with the Thai national education system to take advantage of the higher education system for students in the provinces.
Since there is no standardized Muslim syllabus, the daily teaching method and its contents are being left to the religious teachers themselves. Many local pondok schools continue to teach Islam as the main subjects and Thai-Malayu as the main language, without sufficient tutoring in subjects such as the social sciences and humanities. Some parents do not want to compromise religious teaching classes with other subjects. As a consequence, children studying in private pondoks are unable to compete with other mainstream students coming from elsewhere, including Muslim children who study in Thai schools.
Thai-Muslims face two dilemmas once they reach their youth. Without proper education and lacking the Thai language ability, both oral and written, they find themselves unable to go for higher education in their own country. Most of them choose to go abroad or cross the border to study in Malaysia and other Muslim countries in the region or in the Middle East and Africa. But those educated abroad eventually end up unemployed upon returning home. A survey conducted by a team of scholars from Prince of Songkhla University showed that 60 per cent of Thai-Muslims youth in 2003 could not get jobs. Inevitably, they become a highly alienated group of youngsters. Full of frustration and a sense of hopelessness, some of them have been targeted for recruitment by either criminal groups or separatist groups.
Thailand needs to change its mind-set in dealing with its multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. Some senior Thai officials, for instance, including the statesman Gen Prem Tinsulanonda opposes the teaching and use of Thai-Melayu as a working language in the Muslim areas for fear it would diminish their ability to absorb the Thai language.
Besides the Thai-Muslims, other less well-know ethnic groups including the Karen, Mon, Chong, Mlabri and Meo are also struggling to overcome the injustice and prejudice against them. They want to be accepted and treated as equals in Thailand. The only difference is that their struggle continues without media’s attention.
By Kavi Chongkittavorn, Bangkok-based journalist
Asiaviews, August-September 2007
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